

Social and labor market inclusion of migrants: Myths and veracities in the EU

Martin Kahanec

Central European University, IZA and CELSI

August, 2012, Bratislava



What is the question?

- **Whether we allow immigrants on ‘our sacred soil’?**

OR

- **How not to fail, and better succeed, in the global competition for talents?**

Three themes

- **The demographic context and the need for immigrants**
- **Migrants in Europe**
- **Immigration and integration policy perspectives**




The demographic background

- **Demographic change presents nearly all EU states with formidable challenges:**
 - Ageing populations
 - Scarcity of skilled labor
 - Dynamic loss in the economy (innovation deficits)
 - Financial risks in social security systems
- **Financial and economic crisis adds to the difficulties:**
 - Rising risk aversion
 - Economic decline
 - Negative attitudes toward immigration and new Fortress Europe?
- **Paucity of data and analysis, especially on CEE**

Demographic Changes (2005-2020)

Population share aged 20-64 – Projection 2005/2020




Share of working age population will decrease across the EU

- Scope of intra-EU mobility in cushioning demographic ageing appears limited
- Demand for immigrants will increase especially in EU-15

Ageing (2005-2020)


Old-Age Dependency Ratios – Projection 2005/2020



Share of old people relative to working age population will increase

- Inevitably, the share of young mobile workers will decrease
- Hence, EU societies have to cope with shrinking innovation dynamics
- Even growing intra-EU mobility will not offset ageing

Mobile EU-27 Citizens by Country of Origin (2006)



IZA Expert Survey on High-Skilled Labor Immigration

- A survey of 234 labor market experts from Europe
- 89.0% - the EU needs at least as many immigrants as it has now, and 57.7% - the EU needs more or many more immigrants
- Less conviction that the EU needs low-skilled immigration (60.7 and 27.3%)
- However, 96.7% - the EU needs at least as many high-skilled migrants, and 80.3 % - the EU needs more or many more high-skilled migrants
- Sensitivity to the crisis? 84.5% report no effect of the crisis on their evaluation of the long-term demand for immigrants

		Any effect of the ongoing crisis?		
		Yes	No	Difference
Need at least as many	High-skilled	86.21	98.7	12.49
	Low-skilled	44.82	63.64	18.82
Need more or many more	High-skilled	68.97	82.47	13.50
	Low-skilled	10.34	30.52	20.18


...so there is need for immigrants.

... do we have any?

Migrants in Europe


	Foreign citizens		Foreign-born	
	Other EU	Non-EU	Other EU	Non-EU
EU15:				
Austria	4.1	5.0	6.7	8.7
Belgium	6.4	2.6	6.8	6.7
Denmark	2.9 ²	2.4	2.0	4.6
Finland	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.8
France	2.3	3.3	3.4	7.8
Germany	3.1	2.8	n.a.	n.a.
Greece	1.3	4.8	1.7	5.9
Ireland	5.4 ¹	2.6 ¹	8.8 ¹	3.4 ¹
Italy ²	1.3	3.8	2.2	5.3
Luxembourg	41.2	5.6	37.9	8.6
The Netherlands	1.7	1.9	2.8	9.1
Portugal	0.6	2.8	1.8	5.7
Spain	3.9	8.3	4.5	10.0
Sweden	2.5	2.7	5.5	10.0
UK	2.6	4.3	3.5	8.8
EU12:				
Bulgaria	(0.1) ⁴	(0.1)	n.a.	n.a.
Cyprus	8.1	6.5	8.1	11.0
Czech Republic	0.4	0.4	1.3	0.6
Estonia	0.7	16.8	0.6 ⁴	13.6
Hungary	0.5	0.2	1.3	0.4
Latvia	n.a.	0.7 ³	1.1 ⁴	9.6
Lithuania	n.a.	(0.6)	(0.3) ⁴	3.8
Malta	1.2	1.8	1.7 ⁵	3.0
Poland	(0.1)	0.1	0.2	0.3
Romania	0.1 ²	0.1	n.a.	(0.1) ¹
Slovakia	(0.2)	(0.1) ¹	0.6 ⁴	(0.1)
Slovenia	(0.2) ⁴	(0.2)	(0.7) ⁵	4.6

Immigrants across the EU




Highest shares CY, IE, BE, AT, SE, UK; lowest RO, BG, PL, SK, HU, CZ.

Gross immigration, non-EU, % population




Unskilled immigrants?

c) Percent high-educated EUN immigrants and natives



d) Percent high-educated other immigrants and natives





Non-EU immigrants well-educated, especially in NMSs. Less skilled than natives are EUNs in the EU15, other immigrants in eg ES and FI.



...so we have some immigrants in Europe (good), their numbers are growing (good) and they are relatively educated (also good)

... so is there a problem?

The risk of social and labor market exclusion





- **High and increasing**
- **The situation has worsened between 2007 and 2010**



Migrants

Figure 8.1 The risk of being excluded from the labour market and thus employment opportunities

EU migrants





Non-EU migrants




Migrants cont'd

Irregular migrants



The Policy Matrix




- Based on the Expert Opinion Survey

- A tool to compare and scale the situation of minorities

- The four largest minorities in each country


- Measuring the risk of labor market exclusion and its trend

- The NE corner desires most policy attention



Exclusion results in poverty...

Figure 3.7 Ratio of proportions of migrants and natives at risk of poverty




Source: EU-SILC (2008).

Notes: *All migrants for Germany.

Poverty even if we control for diffs in characteristics...

Figure 4.9: Estimated marginal impact of migrant status on support receipt: At risk of poverty




Source: EU-SILC (2008).


Notes: *All migrants for Germany.

Educated...but brain waste?

c) Percent high-skilled EUN immigrants and natives



d) Percent high-skilled other immigrants and natives



Non-EU immigrants more often work in less-skilled occupations (especially ES, IT, AT, DE < SE, NL), except for some NMSs.

Participation rates (selected countries)

Country	Nationality		Country of birth			
	Nationals	Non-EU nationals	Native-born	Non-EU foreign-born		
				Total	Reside >5 years	Reside ≤5 years
France	78.25	63.43	78.73	68.95	70.41	61.22
Men	83.41	79.96	83.68	81.14	81.21	80.75
Women	73.29	47.59	73.94	57.22	59.92	43.30
N	38 352	1 947	35 574	4 228	3 555	673
Germany	82.80	68.17	83.21	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Men	88.76	83.48	88.89	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Women	76.91	53.70	77.57	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
N	25 396	1 395	23 424	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Italy	66.03	75.49	65.93	74.61	77.30	65.61
Men	79.04	93.30	78.84	92.28	92.78	90.24
Women	53.35	57.56	53.24	58.46	61.87	48.85
N	356 988	13 438	347 604	19 139	14 737	4 402
Sweden	88.44	75.64	89.26	78.85	79.91	71.03
Men	90.54	83.27	91.05	84.38	84.18	85.82
Women	86.31	67.20	87.41	73.45	75.77	55.98
N	163 040	2 890	148 863	13 097	11 530	1 567
UK	78.61	73.12	78.91	72.31	71.56	74.84
Men	86.25	88.88	86.28	86.61	84.89	92.44
Women	71.51	59.47	72.04	59.74	59.86	59.33
N	61 145	2 325	58 056	4 954	3 825	1 129

Non-EU nationals/migrants lower P rate, except for IT and UK men

YSM improvement, but not for SE and UK men

Unemployment rates (selected countries)

Country	Nationality		Country of birth			
	Nationals	Non-EU Nationals	Native-born	Non-EU foreign-born		
				Total	Reside >5 years	Reside ≤5 years
France	8.77	21.78	8.46	17.36	14.90	32.28
Men	8.16	17.72	7.94	14.57	12.87	23.85
Women	9.45	28.33	9.02	21.17	17.58	46.71
N	30 012	1 235	28 006	2 915	2 503	412
Germany	8.13	19.24	7.76	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Men	7.74	19.26	7.30	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Women	8.56	19.22	8.28	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
N	21 028	951	19 492	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>
Italy	5.89	8.88	5.85	8.05	7.20	11.39
Men	4.86	5.47	4.85	5.11	4.66	7.03
Women	7.38	14.46	7.32	12.28	10.99	16.88
N	235 719	10 145	229 186	14 279	11 391	2 888
Sweden	4.16	14.04	3.72	11.74	11.00	17.79
Men	4.15	15.43	3.74	11.63	11.04	15.78
Women	4.16	12.15	3.70	11.86	10.97	20.92
N	144 190	2 186	132 871	10 327	9 214	1 113
UK	4.42	7.00	4.33	7.06	6.72	8.17
Men	4.79	6.57	4.74	6.63	6.66	6.54
Women	3.99	7.56	3.88	7.61	6.80	10.39
N	48 065	1 700	45 814	3 582	2 737	845

Non-EU
nationals/migrants
higher U

YSM improvement,
but not for UK men
(but these have low
U)

Source: Kahanec and Zimmermann,
2010. EU LFS 2007

Marginal effects (selected countries)

Country			Labor force participation				Unemployment	
			All		Married		All	
			Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
FR	Non-EU foreign-born	Intercept	-0.273***	-0.444***	-0.199***	-0.472***	0.155***	0.493***
		Slope	0.017***	0.027***	0.014***	0.031***	-0.004**	-0.017***
	Non-EU national	Intercept	-0.075***	-0.233***	-0.029	-0.299***	0.092***	0.170***
DE	Non-EU national	Intercept	-0.057***	-0.148***	-0.053***	-0.184***	0.068***	0.076***
IT	Non-EU foreign-born	Intercept	0.052***	-0.238***	0.026	-0.336***	0.008	0.116***
		Slope	0.000	0.023***	0.003	0.033***	0.000	-0.004***
	Non-EU national	Intercept	0.064***	-0.073***	0.060***	-0.165***	0.017***	0.066***
SE	Non-EU foreign-born	Intercept	-0.138***	-0.466***	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	0.184***	0.235***
		Slope	0.002	0.017***	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	-0.003***	-0.005***
	Non-EU national	Intercept	-0.104***	-0.179***	<i>n.a.</i>	<i>n.a.</i>	0.113***	0.063***
UK	Non-EU foreign-born	Intercept	-0.031	-0.210***	-0.020	-0.259***	0.044***	0.068***
		Slope	-0.001	0.005**	-0.003	0.008***	-0.001	-0.001
	Non-EU national	Intercept	-0.047***	-0.162***	-0.059***	-0.196***	0.027***	0.033***

Non-EU nationals/migrants P penalty except for men in IT (+) and foreign-born men in the UK (0); U penalty except foreign-born men in IT (0)

YSM improvement in P, but not for foreign-born men in IT (0) and the UK (0); for U no improvement in the UK (0) nor men in IT (0)

Convergence over generations? Questionable.

Ethnic group	Participation rate		Unemployment rate	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Native French	86.8	75.6	10.1	15.1
Total immigrants 1st generation	87.2	60.0	19.0	29.7
Algerians	84.6	63.2	30.1	35.8
Moroccans	84.3	52.8	26.1	35.9
Sub-Saharan Africans	77.1	67.1	27.9	36.0
Turks	91.7	36.3	25.3	45.4
South-East Asians	80.5	60.9	14.1	19.8
Total generation 1.5	82.9	69.2	19.7	26.3
Total 2nd generation	80.9	71.2	16.9	20.7
Algerians	85.6	70.0	28.5	30.4
Moroccans	76.0	54.3	27.2	38.7
Total mixed 2nd generation <small>no. 2010.</small>	82.0	71.0	13.4	18.0
French and Algerian parents	81.4	69.7	16.3	21.1
French and Moroccan parents	74.6	65.8	14.5	20.0

LM outcomes depend on generation, origin and gender

Women: for P and U integration over generations and with mixed parents

Men: for P lower integration over generations, mixed parents helps. For U better integration over generations but 1.5th generation worse than any other, mixed parents helps.




...so we have some immigrants in Europe (good), their numbers are growing (good) and they are relatively skilled (also good).

... so is there a problem?

YES! Immigrants are poorly integrated, and thus talents are lost.


...what should be done?

Identify integration barriers




Learn what do immigrant groups want: Areas integration policies most desired

- Almost all minorities want to change their situation (86% of all respondents, 98% of minority respondents)
- Mainly in paid employment, education, attitudes and housing.



Identify preferred policy principles

- Equal treatment!
- But some room for positive action



...so we have some immigrants in Europe (good), their numbers are growing (good) and they are relatively skilled (also good).

... so is there a problem?

YES! Immigrants are not integrated, and thus talents are lost.

...what should be done?

Integration/inclusion policies etc....but scientists can help by informing the debate

1) are migrants welfare takers?

2) do they shop for welfare?

Group-work: 4 people discuss one of the two questions:


1) are migrants welfare takers?

2) do they shop for welfare?

2 people argue “yes”, 2 people “no”

Welfare takers?


Figure 3.2 Ratio of proportions of migrants and natives: All types of support




Source: EU-SILC (2008).

Notes: *All migrants for Germany.


Ratio of proportions of immigrants and natives: Unemployment support



Estimated marginal impact of immigrant status on support receipt: unemployment, sickness and disability



Ratio of proportions of immigrants and natives: Unemployment support for those who are unemployed



Welfare shoppers?

- Residual immigrant welfare take up may be due to many reasons, one of them being self-selection
- Welfare generous countries may attract immigrants who expect that they have a higher residual propensity to take up welfare
- We look at this issue indirectly:
Do welfare generous countries attract more immigrants?
Does an increase in welfare spending in a given country lead to more immigration?
- Such finding would have consequences for the interpretation of residual immigrant welfare take up and thus immigration/integration policies, as well as welfare policies.

What do we know (and what not)?

- Theory
 - Welfare reduces the volatility and increases the level of expected income of migrants, this in theory leading to the welfare magnet hypothesis (e.g. Heitmueller 2005)
 - As the costs associated with choosing among countries within Europe are negligible compared to those incurred when moving to Europe, even not so big differences in welfare may matter (Borjas, 1999)
- Empirics
 - Borjas (1999): welfare magnet marginally significant among the US states
 - De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009): not too large but significant welfare magnet in EU15
 - Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2008): Social expenditures/GDP significant positive effect only if FE and network effects not controlled for.

What do we do?


- We distinguish welfare components
 - Aggregated measures may mask the true effects
- We take *unemployment benefits spending (UBS) in GDP* a measure of welfare (for now)
 - Sensitive wrt labor market competition, also given the disproportional crude rate of take up by immigrants
- We explicitly account for the possible endogeneity of welfare spending
- We concentrate on Europe
- We have panel data with a good number of observations




Data

- Gross inflows of foreigners/population, 16-64: OECD-SOPEMI
- UBS and other welfare measures/GDP: OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX)
- Contextual variables: (unemployment rate, per-capita GDP, etc): World Development Indicators (WDI) online database.
- Unbalanced panel with 248 observations, 19 EU countries 1993-2008

Gross immigration, non-EU, % population



Social public expenditures on UBS, % GDP



Econometric model

$$m_{it} = \alpha + \beta x_{it-1} + \mathbf{z}'_{it-1} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \theta_i + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where:

m_{it} - immigrant inflows as percentage in total population in country i at time t

x_{it-1} - UBS as a percentage of GDP

\mathbf{z}_{it-1} is the matrix that includes the immigration rate (networks), per-capita GDP, unemployment rate.

All explanatory variables are lagged, as we assume lagged response of potential immigrants. This may also alleviate the endogeneity problem but only partially if at all (see below).

Fixed country and year dummies, so variation only within countries and beyond systemic shocks. Population weights.

Results (OLS, non-EU)

a - without UBS; b - with UBS; c - with other welfare components (health, family, pension); d – no weights

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		Non-EU immigrants		
UBS		0.058 *	0.061 *	0.066 ***
		(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.021)
Stock of non-EU immigrants	0.141 ***	0.129 ***	0.123 ***	0.079 *
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.039)
Per-capita GDP	0.017 ***	0.019 ***	0.018 ***	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Unemployment rate	-0.007	-0.015	-0.005	-0.026
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Constant	-0.056 ***	-0.063 ***	-0.053 ***	-0.02
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.014)
\bar{R}^2	0.64	0.65	0.68	0.52

Results (OLS, EU)

a - without UBS; b - with UBS; c - with other welfare components (health, family, pension); d – no weights

		EU immigrants		
UBS		-0.009 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.013)
Stock of EU immigrants	0.072 *** (0.021)	0.075 *** (0.025)	0.068 *** (0.027)	0.094 *** (0.021)
Per-capita GDP	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Unemployment rate	0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)
Constant	0.000 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.008 (0.010)
\bar{R}^2	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.37
Weights	Y	Y	Y	N
Other welfare components	N	N	Y	N
N	248	248	248	248

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1% level. All models are estimated by fixed effects and contain year dummies. Weights are population counts of each country in the year 2000. Other welfare components are expenditure on health, family and pensions.

Endogeneity of UBS

- OLS results point at a welfare magnet for non-EU immigrants
- But we have an endogeneity problem: UBS may be a function of immigration
 - A) Immigrants themselves directly increase UBS take up or decrease average GDP
 - B) Policy reaction to immigration may cut/expand UBS

Endogeneity of UBS: policy reaction (B)

- We rank countries by change in the stock of non-EU immigrants as percentage of the population and look at their UBS policies with respect to
 - months of employment contributions necessary to qualify for unemployment benefit) and in the duration of unemployment benefits
 - Duration of unemployment benefits
- No evidence that high immigration countries adopted more restrictive measures in terms of eligibility criteria (rather the opposite, if anything)
- Unemployment benefit duration seems to have been reduced more in countries with relatively lower changes in immigration.
- => contrary to what many people might think, this channel could be present creating a positive correlation between UBS and immigration

	Country	Stock non-EU	Stock EU	Employment contributions		Duration	
		Δ 2007-1999	Δ 2007-1999	Value 1999	Δ 2007-1999	Value 1999	Δ 2007-1999
1	Spain	7.85	1.58	12	0	24	0
2	Luxembourg	4.72	1.15	7	0	12	0
3	Italy	3.45	-0.02	12	0	6	1
4	United Kingdom	2.40	0.10	24	-12	6	0
5	Ireland	1.61	0.06	10	0	15	0
6	Portugal	1.59	0.32	18	-9	30	-6
7	Czech Republic	1.41	0.16	12	0	6	0
8	Norway	1.30	0.34	12	0	36	-12
9	Finland	0.72	0.10	11	0	25	-2
10	Austria	0.62	0.74	12	0	10	-1
11	Switzerland	0.52	1.12	6	6	7	11
12	Denmark	0.34	0.25	12	0	60	-12
13	Sweden	0.26	-0.03	6	0	15	-1
14	Slovak Republic	0.21	0.21	24	12	9	-3
15	Hungary	0.16	0.08	12	0	12	-3
16	France	0.07	0.12	4	2	60	-37
17	Netherlands	0.01	0.07	7	0	60	-22
18	Belgium	-0.01	0.38	21	6	60	0
19	Germany	-1.24	0.50	12	0	12	0

Source: OECD (2002, 2007).


So we need to take care of reverse causality – 2SLS

- We need an instrument that is correlated with UBS, but not with immigration
- Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) and Lipsmeyer and Zhu (2011) show the existence of a correlation between the characteristics of the electoral system/governing coalition and social expenditure.
- But each of these can be related to immigration policies
- We need something more neutral wrt left-right or electoral tradition (and that varies across as well as within countries)

A more formal analysis – IV, cont'd

- We propose “the number of parties in the ruling coalition”
- Argument: with a relatively large number of parties in coalition, it is difficult to impose austerity on spending. Or, there are more parties with interest to spend (and win voters)
- Simultaneously, this instrument is unlikely to be directly correlated with immigration. While it is possible that election results are affected by immigration rates or that new parties arise as a consequence of high immigration, it is unlikely to alter the composition of the winning coalition in terms of number of constituent parties
- In principle, any policy reform may be affected by our IV, but we argue that migration policy is a lot more adamant in this respect
- Is this instrument relevant?

First stage: UBS on # of coalition parties



But what if all RHS vars endogenous?

- It may be that persistent shock simultaneously determine stocks of migrants and immigration rates, etc.
- Lags do not solve this problem fully
- We do the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator (2 lags)
 - It takes care of the possible dynamic endogeneity of the processes governing our RHS variables.
 - It uses lagged values of RHS variables as instruments, and calculates appropriate standard errors

Results

	EU immigrants		Non-EU immigrants	
	IV	GMM	IV	GMM
UBS	0.040 (0.065)	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.022)
Stock of immigrants	0.133 *** (0.018)	0.115 *** (0.011)	0.075 *** (0.009)	0.073 *** (0.014)
Per-capita GDP	0.019 *** (0.003)	0.015 *** (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Unemployment rate	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.013 *** (0.006)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)
Constant	-0.068 *** (0.012)	-0.054 *** (0.007)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.005)
N	248	248	248	248

Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses. */**/** indicate significance at the 10/5/1% level. All models are estimated by fixed effects and contain year dummies. All regressions are weighted by the counts of individuals in each country in the year 2000. Instrument is the number of parties in the winning parliamentary coalition. IV estimates are computed using the Stata command *xtivreg2* developed by M.E. Schaffer. GMM estimates are obtained using the Stata command *xtabond2* developed by D. Roodman.

Summary

- UBS and immigration positively correlated
- But this is not due to immigrants' welfare shopping (IV, AB)
- Rather, we find some indication that
 - Immigration may relax welfare provision rules
 - Immigration may increase welfare spending or decrease GDP, or both. From other studies, it is rather the former than the latter. Event that is rather due to compositional than residual effects.

Conclusions

- Europe needs immigrants, mainly highly skilled ones
- We have some, but we are also losing the best
- And those we have are not integrated, so we are losing talents
- To improve the situation we need active policies
- And the policy discourse needs to be well informed, not based on myths
- We bust the myth of excessive immigrant welfare take up as well as that of welfare shopping; there rather are barriers to inclusion that need to be eradicated



Martin Kahanec

Tel/Fax: +36 1 235 3097
Email: kahanecm@ceu.hu

Department of Public Policy
Central European University
Nador utca 9
Budapest 1051
Hungary
www.publicpolicy.ceu.hu